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LEARNINGAND •1 VALUE OF E FLRM
ABrRr
The paper studies under what conditions thevalueof the finn
occasionally increases for a while before it suddenly drops, like a "ly±ble".
We consider the environsent where the trend of net cash flq from a firm's
production depends on uncertain quality of a manager, and the manager is
occasionally replac.od by a new manager. People }cu whether the manager is
replacel, but they do not know the exact quality of the manager so that they
gradually learn about it. We show that, if the current manager is good, the
value of the fins tends to increase sore rapidly than the net cash flow
because people beccnne sore and sore optimistic about the current manager,
until the optimism disappears with sudden retire of the manager. The value
of the fins appears to contain a bubble because the value gradually deviates
from the present value of the current net cash flow until the deviation
disappears. We extend the basic so5.el to allow the firm to replaca
unsuccessful managers endogenously, and show that the value of the finn sore
freopently deviates upward from the present value of the current net cash
flow than downward.
Nobuhiro Kiyotaki




Stock prices appear to be very volatile, and some researchers suspect that
business psychology may play an important role. Onecandidateof such
extrinsic psychology is a speculative bubble, which pushes the stock price
above the fundamental value implied by expectations of future dividends until
the bubble crashes.However, conditions for the existence of a rational
bubble are often very restrictive.(See, for example, TIrole [1982). )This
paper takes an alternative approach and asks under what conditions on the
fundamentals the value of the firm behaves like a bubble, that is. the value
of the firm tends to increase for a while before it suddenly drops.
In the environment we consider, the change of the net cash flow from a
firm's production depends on uncertain quality of a manager and noise, and the
manager is occasionally replaced by a new manager.People know whether the
manager is replaced, but they, including the manager himself, do not know
exactly how good the manager is; they gradually learn about it by observing
the changes in net cash flow under the current manager. We can show that, if
the current manager Is good, people gradually become more and more optimistic
about the manager, and that the value of the firm tends to increase more
rapidly than the net cash flow, until the optimism disappears with sudden
retire of the manager. The value of the firm appears to contain a bubble,
because the value gradually deviates from the present value of the current net
cash flow and then the deviation disappears. While this bubble—like deviation
of the value of the firm can be both upward and downward in the basic model.
we later allow the firm to replace the unsuccessful manager endogenously with
some fixed cost, in addition to the exogenous stochastic retirement (e.g..
sudden death) of the current manager. Then it can be shown that the downward
movement in the value of the firm will not last as long as upward movement on
2average, because the firm will fire the current manager as soon as it finds
him not worth continuing.The value of the firm more frequently deviates
upward from the present value of current net cash flow than downward, and that
the value of the firm tends to increase over time because of the truncation of
relatively inferior managers.A similar story may be applied to replacement
of Investment projects rather than managers.1
There have been previous attempts to apply stochastic regime shifts and
learning to explain the abnormal behavior of asset prices. For example, Flood
and Garber [1980a] develop a model with a regime switch to explain the
movement of the price level; Flood and Garber [1980b[, Hamilton and Whiternan
[19851and Flood and Hodrick[19861discuss identification and the
observational similarity between a bubble and fundamentals when the underlying
process of fundamentals may change in future.Also, Wang [1989) develops a
continuous—time dynamic asset pricing model with informed investors,
uninformed investors and noise traders, showing that the uninformed investors'
learning about the gradually changing trend of the dividends increases
volatility and risk—premium of the stock returns, and Barsky and DeLong [1989]
empirically examines how much learning explains volatility of stock prices.
In the literature of foreign exchange rates, the peso problem is extensively
analyzed, where the seeming deviation of the exchange rate from fundamentals
can be explained by the anticipation of a regime shift in future. Lewis
[1989a,b] and Tabellirii [19881, for example, use learning to explain the
apparent deviation and volatility.2 The value—added in the present paper is
analyzing the time series properties of the value of a firm under recurrent
shifts In the trend of the net cash flow rather than a once—and—for—all shift
and, also, to explain the shifts that are partly endogenous.
Section II develops the basic model where replacement of managers and shifts
in trend are exogenous. Section III compares with the alternative
3specifications one without learning andtheother sisspecified so that shifts
are ignored.Section IV extends the basic sodel to allow for endogenous
replacement of managers by the firs.
4II. Model
Economy consists of s representative agent and many firms producing a
homogeneous product. Consider the net cash flow from the firms production
activity as sales of the product minus costs of employing factors of
production and purchasing investment goods. Suppose for now that the net cash




( t = (l—&t).zt+
where and are mutually independent,and identically and
independently distributed over time. snd are normally distributed with
zero mean and variances and The value of 6 is equal to 0 with y t
probability m and equal to 1 with probability l—m. For instance, imagtne that
the change in the net cash flow of the firm depends on uncertain quality of
the manager (trend component) p and noise Ifthe quality of the manger
is good, is positive and the net cash flow tends to increase, while the
cash flow tends to decrease with a bad manger. With probability a, the
previous manager stays and is unchanged, while with probability I—it,
the manager is replaced 6='andnew random is realized. Although later
we are going to analyze how the firm replaces unsuccessful managers, we assume
for now that the replacement of the manager is exogenous and that the
probability of the replacement is independent of the history of the
performance.
The representative agent is risk—neutral with a constant discount factor .tHe observes the net cash flow and whether the manager Is replaced or not, but
does not observe the quality of managers nor the noise.In other words, he
observes the history ofx
and but not , nor c. In fact, we
assume the only information the agent has Is the history of y, x and &,and
general knowledge about the structure of the economy. There is no tax and all
the values are measured in terms of the homogeneous product. Define the value
of the firm's productive capital as the sum of the value of equity and debt
net of the value of monetary assets held by the firm. Under rational
expectations, the value of the firmatthe beginning of period t satisfies
(4a) 1' E[P1] =E['t+T] + bt
(4b) bt =
whereEt(.] is the conditional expectations operator, conditional upon
Information at the period t, which includes the cash flow in period t, and
whether a shift occurs or not, Thefirst term In the right hand side of
equation (4a) Is the expected present value of the future net cash flow which
is often called fundamentals.The second term bt represents the effect of
extrinsic expectations about future value of the firm, called a speculative
bubble.
In order to concentrate on the fundamentals, we assume there Is no
speculative bubble:
(5) bt =0,for all t.





Et(,.Lt).The first term is the present value of the net cash flow
without the trend, and the second term is the effect of expected quality of
the manager.
In order to formulate expectations about the quality of the manager, we
assume the agent is a Bayesian learner.5Suppose that the current manager
came to the firm at period s, while the current period is t, where s a t.
Since there was no replacement of the manager between period s and period t,
the agent's prior probability density function of is the same as i,which
Is also the same as c
5
2
(7) (p) exp [—(a/2)
2 where e =1/c-and ameansthat the both sides are proportional. The
P P
likelihood function f of the changes In the net cash flow under the current
manager (x,x+1,. -xi)is





wheren t—s+1, a 1/c-2 and x =(1/n) (Z x ). Itthen follows that the
t y y t trs T
posteriorprobability density function for giventhe changes In the net





Therefore the posterior distribution of Is normal with mean m and variance(a +n a )1, where ty
(10) E[) tayxt)tay) =
ay(Yt_Yt_nt)/(ai.t+ntay).
Note that and are the only information necessary for the
distribution of manager's quality and future net cash flow conditional
on the information in period t.
This yields an explicit expression for the value of the firm at period t
ma
(11) Pt
=(1—s) +(1-)(l-ir)(a+n a ) 'ti't_n ). L ty t
The first term may be interpreted as the present value of an infinite stream
of the current net cash flow from production. The second term reflects the
learning about the current manager.Figure 1 illustrates the behavior of the
value of the firm in this model.When the underlying unobserved quality of
manager is good and is positive, not only the first term tends to Increase,
but also the second term tends to increase over time because the agent tends
to raise the assessment of the quality of the current manager with more
favorable observations.6 The second term appears to behave like a bubble,
because the absolute value of the second term tends to increase over time and
then suddenly crashes. Both terms of (11) are, however, fundamentals in the
sense that they come from intrinsic expectations of the future net cash flow
from production, rather than extrinsic beliefs about the value of the firm in
future.
We also know from (11) that the sensitivity of to ttn increases with
a /a 02/a2 and it.Ifchange in the net cash flow x reflects more
y .z y t
managerial quality than noise, so that a/a is large, then responds
8substantially to a change in the net cash flow, because such changes are very
informative for guessing the underlying managerial quality. If manager is
replaced Infrequently, so that m is close to unity, then the current manager
is more likely to stay and has more impact on the expected present value of
the future net cash flow.
III. Comparison to Two Alternatives
In order to evaluate the effects of learning, consider the case in which the
quality of manager isdirectlyobservable. Then the value of the firm is
1 ___________ (12) Pt =(1—p) + (l—)(l—m)
Since the second term is constant under the same manager, it does not look
like a bubble. Recurring trend shifts with replacement of managers may
increase the volatility of the value of the firm, and the firm value will
deviate from the present value of current net cash flow. The deviation,
however, will not tend to grow over time and then crash, unless we include
learning about the unknown managerial quality, as in (11). (See Figure 2.)
The second alternative is when the true process of the unobserved quality of
the manager is (3), but a researcher misspecifies the managerial quality to





where is distributed normally, independently, and identically with mean
zero and the variance (i—m2)c'2.The variance and the auto—covariances of the S P
9change in the net cash flow x are identical for the true systea (1.2.3) and
the misspecified system (1,2,13):
(14)Var(x) = + o, andCov(xx+) =mitie, for ts0.
However,the Bayesian learning process for the unknown trend in the
miaspecified system is very different from that in the true system. The
process of m =E[z)can be represented by Kalman filtering
(15) m =it m1+z (xt
—m1)
where (iT) satisfy v= Z/(Z+it2)and 2 =m2[))-v)22+i2it2]+U-m2)c'2.We can
think of 2 as the variance of conditional on time t—1 information, andas
the weight of the unanticipated change in the net cash flow in revising the
expectation of the trend. Then the Implied process of the value of the firm
deviates systematically from the present value of current net cash flow, but
the deviation will not suddenly crash as in (11). See Figure 3 for the
comparison. Therefore the researcher who specifies the trend to be AR(1) may
find it difficult to explain bubble—like volatile movements in the value of
the firs, since the variance-covariance of changes of net cash flow does not
reveal the true structure of the net cash flow.If changes in the trend of
the net cash flow are not directly observable, the system might become
somewhat in between the basic model )ll) and the model (6,15), but this is a
topic for future investigation.
10IV. ReplacingManagers.
One difficulty with our basic model is that it predicts both positive and
negative deviations of the firm value from the present value of the current
net cash flow.But observations about the value of firms appear to suggest
more frequent upward deviations followed by crashes than downward deviations
followed by sudden upward jumps. Thus, we extend the basic model to allow the
firm to shift the trend of the net cash flow by replacing managers
endogenously8.
Suppose that the firm decides whether to keep the current manager or fire
him at the end of each period. Even if the firm decides to keep the manager,
the manager retires (or dies) with probability 1—s each period. After the
manager either is fired or dies, the firm hires a new manager with a one—time
adjustment cost k in the beginning of the following period.Here we assume
for simplicity that the adjustment cost does not depend on whether the
previous manager was fired or died. All new managers look identical in cx
ante, but in cx post the trend of the net cash flow is different depending on
a match between his skill and the firm's environment9.The net cash flow,
apart from the adjustment cost, is characterIzed by equations (1,2,3). The
difference from the previous model is that the manager's quality changes
(t=1) when the previous manager Is fired in addition to a period he dies
exogenously. Also we assume all firms are free to replace managers but that
the adjustment cost of a firm increases with the number of firms who replace
managers in the economy.
In the steady state, the value of the firm depends on the number of periods
'I
the current manager has managed the firm (the age) n, the expected quality of






whereEtixinewl means the expectation of x conditional on the information in
period t with a new manager, while Et(xlold] is the expectation conditional on
the current manager continuing. Equation (16) says that the value of the firm
at the beginning of period t is equal to the current net cash flow plus the
discounted maximized expected value of the firm in the next period with or
without replacement.The first term in the braces Is the value with firing
the current manager and recruiting a new one.The second term is without
firing the manager, where with probability a the current manager continues to
manage and gets older by one period, and with probability 1—it he dies and is
replaced exogenously.
Define =P(n,m,y)—(1—)y.It measures the deviation of the value of
the firm from the present value of the current net cash flow, when the manager
is n periods old and has the expected quality in.Thenthe assumption of free
trial of new manager with the upward—sloping adjustment cost function implies
that the adjustment cost in equilibrium is equal to the value—added of
introducing a new manager
(17) k E U(a)]=Ii[(l+w) 1.'2z]d(z)
I j 1
where w = and(z) Is the distribution function of the standard normal yp
distribution. The last equality comes from the learning equation (10) with
nt=l. Then Bellman's equation becomes
12(18) J(m) =
Max{





Thesecond equality comes from the fact that when there is no change in the
manager, m+1 =m+ay(xt+i_et)/[a+(nt+l)e] by (10).
The value of the firm in period t with an n periodsoldmanager with




From (18), we know J(m) is a non—decreasing continuous function of m, and
non—negative because the firm always has a choice Of replacement. 10 Thus the
value of the fire is never below the present value of the current net cash
flow. Also, from (17), the value of the firm immediately after the
replacement of the project is higher than the present value of the current net
cash flow by the ssgnitude k on average. 11 Therefore, the magnitudes of
upward jumps in the value of the fire tends to be smaller than downward
crashes caused by the exogenous death of a previously successful manager.
Figure 4 illustrates the value of the firs with endogenous replacement of
managers. When the net cash flow tends to be increasins with a good manager,
the value of the firs tends to increase sore rapidly than the present value of
the current •net cash flow with the appreciation of the manager.The firs
chooses to keep his until he dies, and the death of the successful manager
causes a drop in the value of the firs. When the net cash flow is decreasing
with either a bad manager or a bad luck, the firs will keep the manager as
long as the option value of the current manager is still positive.
13But whenthe evidence becomesunfavorable enough sothat the option value
becomes no longer positive, the firm will decide to replace him for a new
manager. Since bad managers are more frequently fired before die than good
managers, good managers tend to stay longer than bad ones, and the value of
the firm tends to increase over time.
14VI. Conclusion
In this paper we study theoretically conditions under which the value of the
firm is not only volatile, but also sometimes increases more rapidly than the
underlying net cash flow from production for a while then crashes.We found
that the value of the firm appears to contain a bubble when the trend in net
cash flow occasionally shifta but is not directly observable so that an agent
learns only gradually.One obvious question is how much this type of model
can explain empirically aspects of data which are difficult to explain with
existing models. We have to overcome a number of problems for such empirical
implementations. First, here, we study the relationship between the value of
the firm and the net cash flow from production, because our environment
incorporates the Modigliani—Miller theorem, which implies the dividend process
and the debt—equity ratio are indeterminate.But data on the net cash flows
and the value of the firm are inferior relative to data on dividends and
equity prices. Second, we should study the relation between the aggregate and
the individual values of firms in order to explain fluctuations and growth of
the aggregate value of firms. Our hope Is that the results in this paper may
convince the reader that models like this and its potential generalizations
are worth pursuing.
151. Rogoff [1990] independently develops a similar model to analyze political
business cycle, i.e., replacement of manager of a country.
2. Froot and Obstfeld [1989] study a model where a stock price bubble depends
I,
on the dividend in a nonlinear way.Although our model has similar aspects,
it explains where the deviation comes from and how it is related to learning.
Also. Hamilton [1988,89] develops an econometric model when researchers do not
directly observe the shifts in trend of aggregate variables.
3. In some literature,trend includes all of y, i.e., the effects of both
and But here, we call only 'trend or 'quality of manager", and
call "noise".
4. This relationship is independent of the debt—equity ratio and dividend
policy by the Hodigliani-Miller theorem, and can be explained as follows.
Assume that the firm issues one type of equity and a one-period riskless
discounted bonds. The value of the firm at the beginning of the period is
= where and St are the price and amount of equity at the
beginning of period t, and is the value of the firm's net bond position
(i.e., the value of the firm's bonds minus bonds of other agents that it








where dt is the dividend per share and is the price of the one-period
discount bond which pays one unit of output at the beginning of period t+1.
This equation says that the excess of dividend payments over the net cash flow
16from production is finanoed by either new equity issues at the post—dividend
price (the third term) and bond issues net of the bond repayment (the fourth
term). Expected utility maximization of the risk—neutral agent under rational
expectations implies =dt+Et[Psti[
and =. Applyingthese and the
definition of the value of the firs to the cssh flow constraint, we get the
expression in the text. An unfortunate feature of our model, shared with some
other literature, is that the value of the firm is negative with positive
probability. But we ignore this for now until Section III, where the
endogenous replacement virtually overcomes this probiem.
5. See DeCroot [1970) for a detailed discussion on Bayesian learning.
6. When the underlying trend .iispositive from period t—n+1 the term
on average grows proportionally with while the denominator grows
less than proportionally with n.
7. Equation (11) might provide a rational to technical analysis, although
usually shifts in trend are not direotiy observable in technical analysis.
B. See .Jovanovio [1982] and Pakes—Ericson (1988) for the relationship between
learning and exits of firms. The subsequent analysis builds from their
formulation.
9. Although a good match between a manager and a firs say provide bargaining
power to the good manager, we ignore the effect of the manager' s compensation
on the net cash flow.
10. The firs's choice of whether to continue or intentionally replace the
17current manager, can be characterized by the reservation m strategy: continue
an n periods old manager if m a m(n), and fire the manager if m <m(n),where
m(n) solves
0 =(l—)+Jn+i +/((w+n)(w+n+l))z)d(z)
We hope to show that J Cm) a J Cm) and m(n) a mCn+l) a 0.In other words, n n+l
the option value of the current manager is an Increasing function of the
conditional variance of the expected quality, and thus a decreasing function
of the age of the manager. Therefore, the reservation value of m for
replacing the manager is non-decreasing with the age of the manager. Another
issue of interest is how the slope of the adjustment cost function affects the
growth in the long run.If the economy has a limited capacity to adjust so
that the adjustment cost quickly becomes large even when a small number of
firms replacing the managers, then only a small number of firms replace the
managers in equilibrium and average growth will be low.
11. With endogenous replacement of managers, the average increase in the value
of the firm is k, but the average equity price change is zero.This is
because the value of an additional issue of bonds or equities is equal to the
adjustment cost by the cash flow constraint. For example, if the firm issues
debts to finance the adjustment cost k, the value of the firm (debts and
equities) will increase by k on average, while the equity price will not.
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